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1.   What? 
The consequences of the crisis for the Member States’ economies have been twofold: 
Ø  First, increasing numbers of workers have been losing their jobs, and this has fuelled 
demand for support from the state through compensatory income and social protection. 
Ø  Second, public finances have been put under severe strain, further reducing the 
government’s ability to intervene. The situation is even worse for those countries which 
have obliged to adopt cuts in order to reduce their deficit.  
Ø  The result is:  
•  The decreasing flow of social contributions caused by rising unemployment and 
lower wages has in many cases increased the pressure on the financial 
sustainability of national unemployment benefit schemes. 
•  Poverty and unequality have increased all over Europe. 
•  The crisis has been a testing time for European ideals and for the credibility of 
both national and European institutions in the eyes of EU citizens. 
In this context the proposal of a European Unemployment 
Subsidy appears (again) as a possible solution for these 
problems  
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1.   What? 
There are multiple options in order to implement the European 
Unemployment Subsidy Scheme: 
Ø  The classical coordination and harmonization policies. 
Ø  The participation of the EU in the financing of national unemployment 
subsidies schemes.  
Ø  The adoption of a complementary European unemployment subsidy 
Ø  The combination of two or more of the previous options. 
Ø  The substitution of national schemes by a European one. 
2.   Where? 
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3.   Why?  
«There is now significant divergence across the euro area. In some countries, 
unemployment is at record lows, while in others it is at record highs; in some, fiscal 
policy can be used counter-cyclically, in others fiscal space will take years of 
consolidation to recover.» (5 Presidents Report). They suggest the guarantee of a 
“social protection floor” 
 
«All mature Monetary Unions have put in place a common macroeconomic stabilisation 
function to better deal with shocks that cannot be managed at the national level alone» (5 
Presidents Report). 
 
«Experience shows that the current functioning of the European Monetary Union has been 
suboptimal first of all for economic growth. This is why the European Parliament considers 
that employment and social outcomes are among the decisive factors for the sustainability 
and legitimacy of the monetary union, and that in particular automatic stabilizers could 
certainly play an important role» (European Parliament, 2013) 
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3.   Why?  
The main reason is based on the concept “asymetric shock”:  
 
1.  Shocks of this kind happen when some countries in a monetary union experience a 
crisis while others continue to boom.  
2.  The reasons why these shocks happen might be different (e.g. because production is 
collapsing in a single country or an incident is affecting one country but not another), 
but basically they cause capital to be moved from the affected region into those which 
are experiencing a boom, and this cannot be balanced out by the realignment of 
exchange rates (because the monetary policy has been transfered to a Central Bank).  
3.  The result might be a cyclical trend with countries in crisis being pushed even deeper 
into recession while the booming ones overheat and might develop bubbles. 
4.  In theory, the common budget should enable transfer from the booming regions to 
those in crisis. For example, unemployment subsidies transfer funds from ones to 
others. This explains why economists refer to taxes and social expenditure as 
automatic stabilisers. 
A European Unemployment Subsidy 
Scheme: the Challenge 
3.   Why?  
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Indeed, the 2009 crisis has revealed deficiencies in the current design of 
the monetary union and has magnified the economic and social 
consequences of rising unemployment. Insufficient income insurance in 
the event of unemployment increases the social costs of joblessness, but 
also has reinforced the downturn via its effect on consumption and 
aggregate demand. 
4.   How? 
One of the examples taken into consideration is the “American model”. Its main 
characteristics are: 
Ø  The US unemployment insurance cover operates at state level. States remain 
free to decide eligibility conditions, benefit amounts and duration. 
Ø  BUT, Congress can put in place temporary programmes for extending 
allocations, as was the case in 2002 and 2008. This happens via the extended 
and emergency benefits, with the former being partially and the latter 
completely financed at the federal level. This allows the unemployed to 
continue to receive unemployment allocations even beyond the statutory 
period, which corresponds on average to 26 weeks.  
Ø  Consequently, States pay unemployment benefits during normal business 
cycles while federal sources intervene to provide support during economic 
downturns. 
Ø  During downturns, two different schemes exist; one which is automatically 
triggered and another which requires a political decision to be activated. 
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4.   Conclusions 
As we have studied previously, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the 
system introduced by Regulation No 1408/71 is based on mere coordination of 
national laws in the field of social security and is not intended to harmonise them. 
This coordination is based on rules of attachment analogous to those applying in 
private international law.  
As we have seen previously in cases concerning the payment of family benefits 
seem to indicate a relaxation of the Court’s case-law regarding the strict 
application of the principle that the legislation of only one Member State is 
applicable. This relaxation is based on requirements mentioned above. 
The problem is that this second alternative cannot be applied here, because 
Dutch law, as Nicola has already explained, requires not only the residence, but not 
to be under other legislation. However, it is obvious that, under this regulation, by 
exercising their right to freedom of movement, the parties found themselves in a 
situation which was more unfavourable than that of a worker who had spent his entire 
working life in a single Member State.  
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